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In a chapter of Primo Levi's book The Reawakening called "The 
little hen," the narrator describes his friend Cesare's attempt to 
trade six dinner plates for a chicken. Despite the apparent 
simplicity of the task, Cesare's dream to fill his stomach Í9 
impeded by the fact that he only speaks Italian, and the peasants 
with whom he is trying to negotiate the deal only speak Russian. 
The narrator attempts to help Cesare by summoning up the few 
words of Russian that he knows, but to no avail. He writes: 
I was in a pickle. Russian, they say, is an Indo-European 
language, and chickens must have been known to our common 
ancestors in an epoch certainly previous to their sub-division 
into the various modern ethnic families. 'His fretus/ that is to 
1. I would like to thank the SSHRC for the support, which is 
provided in the form of a post-doctoral fellowship, the IQRC-
INRS, and Sherry Simon, who invited me to speak on this 
subject and therefore provided the incentive for developing my 
original comments into an article. I also thank Yzabelle 
Martineau, George Szanto and Denise Helly for their valued 
advice. 
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say, on these fine foundations, I tried to say 'chicken' and 'bird' 
in all the ways known to me, but without any visible result. 
Cesare was also perplexed. Cesare, deep down, had never 
really accepted that Germans speak German, and Russians 
Russian, except out of gross malice; then, in his heart of hearts, 
he was persuaded that they only pretended not to understand 
Italian through some refinement of the same malice. Malice, or 
extreme and scandalous ignorance: clear barbarism. There could 
be no other explanation. So his perplexity rapidly changed to 
anger. 
He grumbled and swore. Was it possible that it was so difficult 
to understand what a chicken is, and that we wanted it in 
exchange for six plates? A chicken, one of those beasts that go 
around pecking, scratching and saying 'coccode-e-eh2:' and 
rather half-heartedly, glowering and sullen, he put on a very 
second-rate imitation of the habits of the chicken, crouching on 
the ground, scraping first with one foot and then with the other 
and pecking here and there with his hands shaped like a 
wedge. Between one oath and the other, he also cried 'coccode-
e-eh;' but this rendering of the chicken's cry is of course highly 
conventional; it is only heard in Italy and has no currency 
elsewhere?. 
This is a case of how the inability to translate a simple word can 
stands in the way of the satisfaction of an essential need, in this 
case that of allaying the hunger that recently liberated prisoners 
felt after their liberation from the Auschwitz death camp. In this 
scene, Cesare refuses to believe that persons cannot understand 
the Italian word for chicken; after all, if Italian children can 
understand the Italian word for chicken, how is it that Russian 
peasants, who continuously deal with livestock and foodstuffs, 
cannot understand the Italian word for chicken? Cesare is all the 
2. This sound seems rather more appropriate for a rooster; 
however the subject of discussion is indeed a chicken. The 1966 
French translation, published by Grasset, uses coccodé. This is a 
notable example of problems in cultural translation, but the 
details are irrelevant to my argument. 
3. Primo Levi, The Reawakening, translated by Stuart Woolf (NY, 
Collier Books, 1987), p. 119. 
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more confounded by the peasants inability to decipher his 
dramatic rendition of the chicken's behaviour, and of the sound 
that the chicken makes, rendered into the Italian language as 
'coccode-e-eh/ 
The drama and the urgency of cross-cultural 
communication as rendered by the translator and interpreter in 
times of distress, as well as the sometimes comical, sometimes 
tragic elements of failed human interaction, are the subjects of 
this paper. But rather than elaborating issues arising out of Primo 
Levi's descriptions of ex-prisoners of Nazi extermination camps, 
I will be describing the plight of persecuted persons who have 
come to Canada to claim Convention refugee status. There are 
similarities between the two processes; but the arbitrators are not 
common peasants who can offer food, they are Canadian 
immigration officials who can offer territorial asylum; the 
languages of currency are not Russian and Italian, they are, on 
the side of the Canadian officials, either French or English, and 
on the side of the claimants, virtually any language or dialect 
known to man; and finally, the 'coccode-e-eh/ that untranslatable 
sound of the Italian chicken, the language that will act as a kind 
of intermediary between the claimant and the Immigration 
department, is, in the case of the Convention refugee claimant, 
the language of persecution; silence, scars, tears, pleas, and 
impassioned cries. 
The most significant example of the small amount of 
work that has addressed the specific question of communication 
breakdowns in refugee hearings is Walter Kälin's article 
"Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in 
the Asylum-Hearing4," which discusses "five (partially 
overlapping) obstacles to an undistorted interaction between 
asylum-seeker and official:" "a) the manner in which the asylum-
seeker expresses him- or herself; b) the interpreter; c) the cultural 
relativity of notions and concepts; d) different perceptions of 
time; and e) the cultural relativity of the concepts of 'lie' and 
'truth'" (p. 231). Focusing upon the cultural differences between 
4. International Migration Review, Vol. XX (2), pp. 230-241. 
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the asylum-seeker and the refugee official, Kälin demonstrates 
how distortions in the process of communicating the claim 
seriously jeopardize the apparent veracity of the claimant's 
narrative. Kälin's work is a real-world example of problems in 
cross-cultural communication described elsewhere in works by, 
for example, V.C. Bickley, C. Geertz, W. Gudykunst and Y.K. 
Kim, K. Oberg, and L. Pospisil, and is an important contribution 
to the study of claimant success in the courtroom, as explored 
previously by P. Bohannan, B. Danet, M.B. Hooker, M. Parkinson, 
K.R. Scherer and others5. This article complements Kälin's by 
focusing upon the role of the interpreter, and by situating the 
issues into a context that is uniquely Canadian (Kälin describes 
his experiences as Counsel for claimants in Switzerland from 
1980 to 1983) through reference to actual Canadian refugee claims 
and rulings. My hypotheses are as follows: first, the system as 
presently construed cannot fulfil the objectives to which it makes 
claim (through reference to the 1952 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and to the 2967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, upon which the Canadian Immigration Act is based); 
5. See for example V.C. Bickley, "Language as the Bridge," 
Cultures in Contact, ed. S. Bochner (Oxford, Pergamon, 1982, pp. 
99-125); P. Bohannan, 'The Differing Realms of the Law," The 
Ethnography of Law, supplement to American Anthropologist, 
67(2), pp. 33-42; B. Danet, "Language in the Courtroom," 
Language, Social Psychological Perspectives, ed. H. Giles et al., 
(Oxford, Pergamon, pp. 367-376); C. Geertz, Local Knowledge 
(NY, Basic Books, 1983) and The Interpretation of Cultures (NY, 
Basic Books, 1973); W.B. Gudykunst and Young Yun Kim, 
Communicating With Strangers (Reading MA, Addison Wesley, 
1984); K. Oberg, "Culture Shock: Adjustment to New Culture 
Environments," Practical Anthropology, 7, pp. 177-182; M. 
Parkinson, "Language Behaviour and Courtroom Success," 
paper presented at the International Conference on Language 
and Social Psychology (University of Bristol, England, July 
1979); L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law (NY, Harper and Row, 
1971); and K.R. Scherer, "Voice and Speech Correlates of 
Perceived Social Influence in Simulated Juries," Language and 
Social Psychology, eds. H. Giles and R. N. St. Clair (Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1979, pp. 88-120). 
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second, persons of backgrounds that differ dramatically from 
those of Canadian adjudicators are most handicapped by the 
present system by virtue of their being most dependent upon the 
interpreter and probably least able to judge the efficacity of their 
own testimony; and third, the assumption that contradictions 
during the hearing should be grounds for rejecting or doubting 
the veracity of the claim places undue burden upon the refugee 
and upon the interpreter who is called to represent the narrative 
before the adjudicators. 
In order to fully articulate the difficulties facing a 
Convention refugee claimant, it is necessary to describe the 
process known as the Canadian Convention refugee hearing, 
before turning to a detailed description of the obligations and 
obstacles faced by the interpreter in Convention refugee 
hearings6. This kind of interpretation is cross-cultural, belonging 
to a realm where words are seldom sufficient, and where 
culturally contingent renditions of reality through sounds, — 
'coccode-e-eh/ 'cocorico/ 'cock-o-doodledo/ and so forth, — 
become particularly pertinent. 
The Convention refugee claim 
Persons who have been persecuted in their country of origin 
have the right, under International Law, to claim Convention 
refugee status in host countries according to the 1951 Convention 
6. I make a distinction here between translator and interpreter to 
draw attention to the fact that the persons who is charged with 
rendering the hearing from a language other than French or 
English for the purposes of the Canadian Convention refugee 
hearing bears the burden of both literal translation and 
interpretation as well as the interpretation of the overall sense 
of the phrases, gestures and concepts articulated during the 
hearing. These processes are subject to varying interpretations 
since there exists a margin within which various meanings can 
be proposed. 
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relating to the Status of Refugees7, a Convention which was worked 
out following World War II and adopted by a Conference of 
Pleni-potentiaries of the United Nations on 28 July 1951 (it 
entered into force on 21 April 1954) to address the urgent issue 
of repatriating, or patriating, wartime refugees and displaced 
persons. Once the short-term post-war obligations had been met, 
the United Nations recognized that the system would have to be 
modified to account for the growing numbers of refugees from 
the Third World. The Convention, which had been created to 
address "refugee situations that were known to exist at that time 
[1951], or to those which might subsequently arise from events 
that had already occurred" could not account for this new, 
apparently long-term, refugee phenomenon. As a result, the 3967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees0 was prepared and, 
following "consideration by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, it was opened for accession on 31 January 1967 and 
entered into force on 4 October 19679." The force of the latter 
Protocol was to recognize that "it is desirable that equal status 
should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition in the 
Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 195110." 
Canada signed the Convention (and its accompanying 
Protocol) in the 1970s, although the Immigration Department had 
adhered to their basic principles since their respective dates of 
adoption. Most of the countries in the world are also signatories 
to this Convention, with the notable exception of the United 
States, which follows a similar but distinct set of laws. The 
Convention itself is very simple, and its basic tenets are set forth 
7. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. 
8. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267. 
9. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status; under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Geneva 1979), p. 4. 
10. Handbook 81. 
136 
in Chapter 1, Article 1A(2) of the Convention, where the term 
"refugee" is said to apply to any person who: 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. 
The catch is that potential refugee claimants, and there are an 
estimated 17 million potentially legitimate claimants worldwide 
(by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee conservative 
estimates), must make themselves eligible for status 
determination (i.e. they must be "outside of the country of his 
nationality"), usually by illegally fleeing their country of origin. 
Persecuted persons seldom have the either the means or the right 
to travel, and in most cases the possibility of flight is minimized 
by the fact that the potential claimant's liquid assets as well as 
his or her personal papers (including passports and birth 
certificates) are confiscated as a result of the activities for which 
they are being persecuted. This does not figure directly into my 
present discussion, but it must nonetheless be accounted for 
when contextualizing the claim process and when assessing the 
wisdom of governments' decisions to expel persons who arrive 
with "phoney documents." It should also be noted that in the 
absence of written documentation upholding the testimony of the 
claimant, the oral hearing (and therefore the role of the 
interpreter), become paramount to the success of the claim: 
Since few asylum seekers are able to prove their claims through 
written evidence such as decisions of courts, warrants of arrest 
or press reports of their arrest, many countries rely primarily 
upon an in-person interrogation or a hearing to establish the 
facts and to examine the credibility of the applicant. In the 
absence of written evidence, the interrogation or hearing, and 
thus the communication between asylum-seeker and official, 
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becomes crucial to the decision on political asylum applications. 
(Kälin, pp. 230-231) 
Those persecuted persons who do manage to leave their country 
of origin and make it to (say) Montreal's Mirabel airport must 
follow a formal procedure in order to undergo a refugee hearing. 
At the first opportunity, the claimant must request status by 
announcing to a Canadian Immigration official that he or she is 
a refugee. After a preliminary interview with a two-members 
panel (comprised of a member of the Refugee Board and an 
immigration adjudicator), in which the claimant must convince 
one of the officials present that the claim is potentially legitimate, 
the refugee is given a date for a full-scale hearing which is 
designated to determine whether the claimant in question is in 
fact a legitimate refugee according to the tenets of the Canadian 
Immigration Act. 
Hearings in Canada can be held in either English or 
French, and they unfold much like any other trial; but because of 
the peculiarities of the hearings Handbook On Procedures And 
Criteria For Determining Refugee Status sets out a number of 
specific Procedures that act as guidelines for signatory countries. 
Of notable interest for a discussion of translation and inter-
cultural communication is article 190, which states that: 
It should be recalled that an applicant for refugee status is 
normally in a particularly vulnerable situation. He finds himself 
in an alien environment and may experience serious difficulties, 
technical and psychological, in submitting his case to the 
authorities of a foreign country, often in a language not his 
own. His application should therefore be examined within the 
framework of specially established procedures by qualified 
personnel having the necessary knowledge and experience, and 
an understanding of an applicant's particular difficulties and 
needs (p. 45). 
and article 192 (iv), which adds that "the applicant should be 
given the necessary facilities, including the services of a 
competent interpreter, for submitting his case to the authorities 
concerned" (p. 46). The technical assistance to which the claimant 
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has access in this country is the Counsel (who is chosen by the 
claimant) and the interpreter, and he or she also may also request 
assistance from refugee assistance groups including the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
The procedure in the Canadian hearing follows the tenets 
of the Convention: the basic facts are set out, the persecution is 
discussed and compared to the kinds of persecution that are 
acceptable under Canadian (and international) law, the claimant's 
testimony is scrutinized — which basically means that the 
Refugee officials look for contradictions or so-called lies, — and 
then the claimant goes home and awaits the final decision. One 
crucial point: until 1989, decisions about the validity of a claim 
were not made by the immigration officer present during the 
hearing. Instead, the entire hearing was transcribed, and the 
decisionmakers, the Refugee Status Advisory Committee (based 
in Ottawa), would read the transcription and accompanying 
documentation and make their decision on that basis alone. This 
of course meant that the role of the interpreter was all the more 
crucial because the whole apparatus of non-verbal 
communication was not available to the adjudicators and because 
there was no way to verify apparent errors or contradictions with 
the lawyer or the claimant without a follow-up interview11. 
Although the basic observations and conclusions of this article 
are applicable not only to the contemporary Canadian 
adjudication procedures, but also to procedures followed in many 
countries of the world, the examples provided arise for the most 
part from research on hearings that were conducted in 1987, 
during the period at which decisions were still rendered by the 
Refugee Status Advisory Committee. Some procedures, as I've 
already pointed out, have been refined (although with the 
exception of the decisionmaker being present in the room most 
modifications since 1987 are to the detriment of the claimant); but 
the problems of inter-cultural communication remain as 
11. On this point, see my Ph.D. Dissertation, "The Construction 
Through Discourse of the Productive Other: The Case of the 
Canadian Convention Refugee Hearing" (McGiIl University, 
1992, chapter 4). 
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described. Furthermore, all documents quoted in this article are 
authentic, and I have copied the texts as they were submitted to 
the Refugee Determination Board; errors of language and syntax 
in these citations were present in the originals. 
The Convention refugee hearing 
At the beginning of each refugee hearing the official representing 
Immigration Canada reads out a statement: until 1989, for 
example, this statement was as follows: 
Allow me at this point to explain to you the purpose and the 
sequence of this examination. This meeting is not an inquiry. 
We are here today to gather information concerning your claim 
to be a Convention refugee. I will not make any 
recommendations nor judgements during this examination, and 
1 have no decision-making power over your case. We shall 
proceed in the following manner. First of all, we will rapidly 
review your Basic Data Form and we will examine your 
passport and copies of these documents will be attached to 
your examination under oath. In the second place, I will read 
to you the definition of a Convention Refugee. Finally, it will 
be your responsibility to give us the reasons why your fear 
persecution in your country, and why you are claiming political 
refugee status in Canada. The information that you will give 
should be related as closely as possible to the definition of 
Convention refugees, and moreover to you. The Refugee Status 
Advisory Committee is aware of the general situation that 
exists in your country and therefore I am asking you to limit 
your statement to facts and events pertaining to your particular 
case. During your statement, try to keep a chronological order 
of the events, and please be as precise as you can concerning 
the dates, the places and the names of any persons stated 
during your examination. Furthermore, for the purpose of the 
transcription, I would ask you to spell all the names of the 
persons and places that you mention during your statement. 
Your counsel may assist you by asking you questions. I might 
also intervene to try to clarify certain points. If you have notes, 
you may freely refer to them and at the end you and your 
Counsel will have a period of time to add any other relevant 
information to your claim. 
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The role of the interpreter in the procedure thus described is 
critical, particularly since the Mulroney government found it fit 
to tighten laws regulating refugee determination by refusing 
requests for appeal except for reasons of "error in law" (which 
generally suggests that that prescribed procedures for claiming 
were not followed by the Board). This means that under the 
present guidelines the claimant gets only one chance to make his 
or her case; if there are errors, lacunae, or contradictions in the 
testimony — even if they are not the fault of the claimant — then 
refugee status may not be granted and claimants may be 
deported back to their country of origin, with the possible 
consequence of continued persecution or death. 
Most of these claimants come from the Third World, and 
most of them speak neither English nor French, or, in some cases, 
they can speak one or both but prefer to give this crucial 
testimony in their mother tongue. Thus if the claimant so 
chooses, he or she has the right to an interpreter, who is 
appointed by Immigration Canada. In the case where an 
interpreter is present, the following swearing-in takes place at the 
outset: 
Par l'A.l.S. [l'Agent d'immigration supérieur] (à l'interprète): 
Q. Nous avons aujourd'hui les services d'un interprète. 
Monsieur, je vais vous assermenter, veuillez placer votre main 
droite sur la Bible. Jurez-vous de traduire fidèlement et 
correctement, du français à l'espagnol et de l'espagnol au 
français, toute question, réponse ou document qui peuvent être 
présentés ou soumis à cette déclaration? 
R. Je le jure. 
Merci. 
In English, the standard format is as follows: 
By the S.I.O. [Senior Immigration Officer] (to the interpreter): 
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Q. Please place your right hand on the bible. Do you swear sir 
to translate faithfully, correctly and to the best of your ability 
from English to Spanish and from Spanish to English all 
questions, answers, testimony, documents or anything else 
which may be presented during the course of this examination? 
A. 1 do. 
Thank you. 
The interpreter's role is to translate each sentence of the hearing; 
thus the hearing usually proceeds from one sentence to the next, 
with a brief pause in between to allow for the translation. 
Variation between the speaker's intended meaning and the 
translated text, is, by the very nature of the procedure, inevitable. 
Interpreters are given the task of both making possible 
communication between persons speaking different languages, 
and acting "as mediatorfs] between cultures12." Walter Kälin 
points out that even when excellent interpreters are available, 
which is the exception in this country (see further on), systemic 
problems exist: 
Because of the close links between language and culture, 
however, even excellent translators fulfil this task only when 
they attempt to communicate in their translations the cultural 
context of words and concepts, interpreters used in the asylum 
procedure often not only lack this sophistication; sometimes 
they are also not qualified or they make mistakes because of 
fatigue resulting from a lengthy hearing. AU this may distort 
the communication between asylum-seeker and refugee (p. 233). 
Any number of examples exist to back up Kälin's claim that a 
failed interpretation can lead to contradictions in the testimony, 
which in turn can be grounds for rejection of the claimant as 
refugee. I will set forth a selection of potentially decisive errors 
made by interpreters further on; however it is useful to first 
situate these errors in terms of their legal consequences. 
12. V.C. Bickley, "Language as the Bridge," Cultures in Contact, ed. 
S. Bochner (Oxford, NY, Toronto, Pergamon, 1982), p. 107. 
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Legal Consequences of Failed Interpretation 
To suggest that minor errors made by the interpreter could be 
fatal is no overstatement; I base this opinion on a reading of two 
cases13, in which I highlighted the attention payed by the Senior 
Immigration Officer to apparently contradictory testimony and to 
empirical data, and on a reading of cases in which unsuccessful 
refugee claims have been reviewed internally, by the Refugee 
Appeal Board, and 'externally14/ by the Canadian Federal 
Appeal Court. In one particular example, The Case of A-1265-87, 
Appeal before Federal Court Judges Heald, Hugellen, and Mahoney 
(ruling written by ]udge Mahoney), Judge Mahoney is called to rule 
upon the decision of the Refugee Appeal Board to reject a claim 
made by a Ghanian, Charles Kofi Owusu Ansah, on the grounds 
that the testimony is inconsistent. The Board's decision contains 
the following statement and example which I will cite at length 
as a means of dramatizing the degree to which even the slightest 
detail can become grounds for rejection: 
The various events of the applicant's Odyssey as related by him 
in the record, as well as during the course of the hearing, are 
full of inconsistencies and contradictions which lead the Board 
to question the credibility of the applicant. I wish to highlight 
some of these inconsistencies and contradictions. 
The applicant testified that the friend of his friends whom he 
met in Nigeria gave him $500.00 upon arrival in Brazil in order 
to secure an airline ticket and to obtain any other 
documentation necessary. However, at page 50 of the transcript 
of the hearing is transcribed the following testimony by the 
applicant: 
13. This research was undertaken for my Ph.D. dissertation (cf. 
note 11). 
14. This may not be the right word since Federal Court judges are 
appointed by the government; however given their status and 
their virtual impermeability to reprimand, they are generally 
more impartial than the adjudicators of the Refugee Appeal 
Board. 
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Q. What nationality was he? 
A. He's a Nigerian. 
Q. Okay. And what did he do for you? 
A. So there he told me that — I explain everything to him and 
my friends also supported what I told him about myself, so this 
man, he feel sympathy for me and he said he can help me. But 
not financially, because he wasn't all that financially good. So 
the help he can give me is if I can travel with him from Lagos 
to Port Harcourt. (The underlining is the Board's) 
The Board has singled out the phrase "but not financially, 
because he wasn't all that financially good" as proof of 
inconsistent testimony. Judge Mahoney's comments concerning 
the Board's ruling are as follows: 
The Board based its decision as to his refugee claim on the 
finding that the Applicant was not credible. To the extent that 
it based that finding on the foregoing "inconsistencies," it based 
its decision on an erroneous finding of fact made without 
regard to the material before it. The finding of an inconsistency 
in the cook being in funds after the voyage and not "all that 
financially good" before one is so patently unreasonable as to 
fall into the same category. The failures to disclose the name of 
the assisting soldier, the location of UFLG head office and to 
produce additional documentation, while correctly found as 
facts, cannot be rationally related to the Applicant's credibility. 
The Board erred in law in so relating them. 
This demonstrates that even a minor detail, in the hands of an 
unsympathetic Board, can be grounds for dismissing obviously 
valid claims. This must be born in mind when reading the 
following examples of interpreter's mistakes. Furthermore, since 
present rules forbid appeals except in cases of demonstrable 
errors in law, there is no possibility of a fresh hearing if the 
interpreter is deemed incompetent. Even under the pre-1989 
rules, which were far more lenient, errors in translation were 
generally insufficient grounds for a new hearing because, as 
Roger Cantin (a legal advisor to the Refugee Appeal Board) 
notes, "minor translation inadequacies in the transcript of the 
examination under oath are... not defects enough to undermine 
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the validity of the decision of the Minister15" (see Milius and 
Minister of Employment and Immigration (F.C.A., no. A-1130-83), 
Pratte, Marceau, MacGuigan, J.J., December 20, 1984). Cantin 
does note one exception where, "due to 200 places in the 25 page 
transcript of the examination under oath which were marked 
inaudible, the Board refused to entertain the application for 
redetermination because of such serious and fundamental 
prejudice to the claimant as to nullify the Minister's decision and 
the examination under oath16." This is a truly exceptional case; 
as such it demonstrates the limits to which one must go before 
the Board will consider dismissal on the grounds of poor 
performance on the part of the interpreter. 
The Interpreter and the Convention refugee hearing 
There are a number of ways in which the interpreter, or the 
system, can fail the claimant. The presence and the use of an 
interpreter is at the discretion of the claimant, and in certain 
cases, it is clear that the claimant should have opted to make use 
of the interpreter's services. For example, in the case of a 
Pakistanian claimant, the following foray was recorded: 
BY THE S.I.O. (to the person concerned): 
Q. Do you think that you have said everything that you 
wanted to say regarding your fear of persecution? 
A. 
15. Roger Cantin, Redetermination of a Claim to be a Convention 
Refugee; A Review of the Jurisprudence, unpublished manuscript 
written for the Immigration Appeal Board (1986), p. 14. 
16. Although inaudible testimony was in this case apparently the 
fault of the interpreter, it in other cases be the fault of an 
inattentive transcriber, or a transcriber who, knowledgeable of 
the fact that payment for work done was made in accordance 
to the number of pages completed every day, simply did not 
wish to make the time-consuming effort of rewinding the tape 
to listen once again to the interpreter's voice. See discussion 
concerning the role of the transcriber in chapter 4 of my The 
Construction Through Discourse of the Productive Other, op. cit. 
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Q. Do you think you have said everything that you want 
to say, or wanted to say? 
A. No, I think I have said everything. 
Q. Yes I have said everything, you should say. 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Are you satisfied that you expressed yourself quite 
well without the need of the interpreter, only a few 
times? 
A. Yes. I have satisfied myself. 
Q. Anything else to say? 
A. No. 
The second kind of failed interpretation is simply the fault of an 
incompetent interpreter. In an article by M. Lalonde called 
"Refugee board says test flawed as 40% fail interpreters' exam," 
published in the February 18,1992 Montréal Gazette, the accuracy 
of the interpretations provided by interpreters working for 
Immigration Canada was put into doubt, confirming some of the 
worst fears of persons who work in the area of immigration law. 
In the spring of 1991, interpreters were given tests in order to 
implement standardized accreditation for immigration 
interpreters. Of the 370 interpreters who took the tests at the 
board's five regional offices, 40% failed. Having seen the results, 
a former employee of the Quebec-Atlantic region office in 
Montréal is cited in the article as stating that "a lot of people are 
not getting a fair shake because the interpreters used by the 
refugee board are not capable of doing their jobs" (A4). In the 
article there are some remarkable quotes from an immigration 
lawyer named William Sloan, who states that "I had one 
[interpreter] who translated 'socialist part/ as 'social group/" 
and, further on: "I've seen cases where a claimant with two 
university degrees is made to sound completely garbled (by an 
incompetent interpreter). That can cause contradictions where 
their [sic] are none." These contradictions, as I've already said, 
are grounds for rejecting claimants; the interpreters, therefore, 
like other links in this system, undermine a potentially valid 
claim. 
Interpreters can also create gaps in the testimony by 
making incomplete or selective translations. If the lawyer or the 
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immigration official do not recognize this early on, then the 
claimant's testimony might be maligned without anyone ever 
realizing that the fault is with the interpreter and not with the 
claimant's description of his or her experience. For example, in 
the case of a Turkish claimant, Monsieur R. who began by 
making his claim in French, there was a switch after fifteen 
minutes of testimony: 
By the Senior Immigration Officer: 
Monsieur R. on dirait que vous ne comprenez pas les questions. 
Si il y a des choses que vous ne comprenez pas, faites signe à 
l'interprète. Il va vous le traduire. 
By the Counsel: 
Monsieur R. is your French better than your English, or...? 
By the claimant: 
My English is better than my French, but... 
Counsel: 
Okay, we'll continue in English. 
Claimant: 
No problem. 
It seemed as though the testimony was being transmitted 
correctly and that everything was normal, until some of the 
answers to questions seemed discontinuous with the questions 
being asked: 
Counsel: 
Mr. interpreter, is it an impression I have, or are we losing 
something in this interpretation? It looks like my client has very 
long answers and that yours are quite short. Of course, Mr. R. 
is able to see if everything has been said. 
By the Senior Immigration Officer: 
Is something wrong? 
By the counsel: 
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Mr. R. Please make sure that everything is... that everything is 
correct. And please make your answers short... phrase after 
phrase, so that we are sure not to lose anything. 
Further on in the same case, when the Counsel realized that there 
were many place and proper names that were unfamiliar to him 
and therefore to the person who would transcribe the case, he 
again spoke to the interpreter. 
By the counsel: 
Could you please spell something so that we can have some 
spelling around here? 
The kinds of words that were causing difficulty were Yusuf, the 
given name of the person that helped him, Iskenderum and 
Antioshiya, two persons who were killed in the prison where the 
claimant was being held. That these names be correctly spelled 
is imperative since it is the kind of empirical data that can be 
verified by the adjudicators of the case. Much later on in the 
same hearing the interpreter was replaced not because he could 
not understand the claimant, but because he had difficulty 
expressing himself in English. 
The other difficulty that the claimant has is that the 
refugee hearings are legal documents, and as such even small 
lacunae on the part of the interpreter could be fatal for technical 
reasons. For example: 
Senior Immigration Officer: 
Let me now ask you five questions related to your persecution. 
In your country do you have a well-founded fear of persecution 
because of your race? 
Claimant: 
No. 
Counsel: 
You're not making an exact translation. I am sorry, I hate to 
trouble you. I know that this is hard. He said well-founded. 
You have to translate the whole sentence and you have to try 
and be precise. 
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When the Counsel suspects that the interpreter is incompetent, 
he can request that a new one; unfortunately, the previous 
testimony is not deleted, there is simply a pause in the hearing 
while the interpreter is replaced. 
Sometimes the interpreter is called upon to undertake 
more than just a translation, which brings us into the realm of 
cross-cultural translation. This kind of interpretation can take 
many forms: first, there are clarifications about customs, places, 
foods, and so forth, where the interpreter helps to describe 
certain customs to the Canadian officials. For example, in the case 
of a Sri Lankan claimant: 
S.I.O.: 
What is your place of birth, and in which country is that? 
Claimant: 
Puthur (phonetic pudder), Sri Lanka, P.U.T.H.U.R. 
S.I.O.: 
Wait, is that Puther or Putter? 
Claimant: 
Puther. 
Interpreter: 
Excuse me, th's and d's in Tamil are commonly interchanged. 
Second, interpreters are sometimes called upon to verify data 
concerning the country of origin. For example, in a case involving 
a Pakistanian claimant: 
Counsel: 
... Following my client's entry into the Pakistan People's Party, 
he became a very active member, and began making door to 
door propaganda for that party. In 1974, he was elected area 
organizer for the P.P.P. in Pira Gahib. 
Interpreter: 
The P.P.P. had area organizers? 
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Claimant: 
Yes, by 1974 they did. 
Third, there is the translation of gestures and bodily marks (i.e. 
scars indicating torture) into text. Recall that until 1989 it was 
necessary to describe all events that occurred in the room because 
the decisionmakers were not present. So the interpreter was also 
called upon to describe bodily marks into words. For example: 
Counsel: 
Were you tortured during the time that you were interred in 
the prison in Pakistan? 
Claimant: 
Yes. 
Lawyer: 
Can you give us details? 
Claimant: 
First they kept on beating me and then they took melted wax 
and which they put... 
Interpreter: 
He is pointing to his left side of his chest and he says that he 
has a scar over there still. 
Lawyer: 
What did they put there? 
Claimant: 
Scalding hot wax. 
S.I.O.: 
Please take off your sweater and show us. 
Interpreter: 
The claimant is showing us a long scar, about twenty five 
centimetres long and a twenty five cent piece in diameter. 
Fourth, there is the job of interpreting silence, giving meaning to 
gaps or silence in the claimant's testimony. A Sri Lankan 
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claimant, for example, refused to reply to certain critical 
questions; the interpreter was called upon to, as it were, interpret 
the claimants reticence: 
Claimant: 
I was there with my father in law, my mother in law and my 
cousin, in my father in law's house. He had sent the other 
families home, to Jaffna, to remain there, knowing there were 
riots. Some members of the government militia came into the 
house during the riots. 
S.I.O.: 
And then? 
Claimant: 
They urn, they damaged the house. 
Interpreter: 
1 am sorry, I believe that he means that they destroyed it. 
S.I.O.: 
Is that correct? 
Claimant: 
Yes. Then they were looking for this man. He was hiding under 
a bed in the house, with his wife and child. The child was two 
or three years old. The child escaped from under the bed, he 
crawled out of the room. The militia snatched up the child and 
took him, and they wanted to snatch the father. So the father 
jumped out to save the son. So luckily the son was given to 
someone who was in the house and who went out with the 
child. Then my father in law was stabbed badly, more or less 
killed. 
S.W.: 
What do you mean more or less killed? 
Interpreter: 
They killed him. 
S.I.O.: 
Is that correct? 
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Claimant: 
Yes. They stabbed him, they beat him, and then they put petrol 
on him, set him on fire. Then afterwards, my mother in law 
was sent up north from Colombo to Jaffna. 
Numerous other examples of the peculiar role that the interpreter 
plays in refugee hearings could be mentioned, examples of when 
they must decipher prices relative to moneys spent in the country 
of origin, examples of how they must interpret the meaning of 
time for persons from cultures where time is measured or 
evaluated differently, examples of how interpreters must give 
long descriptions of apparently simple words, like brother for 
example, which happens to mean fellow members of a tribe 
within certain Ghanian groups. These are often uplifting 
examples of how potentially-crippling misunderstandings can be 
clarified when the interpreter is allowed to speak beyond word-
for-word translation. In fact, I had to look through several 
hundred cases in order to find the examples provided, because 
Immigration Canada apparently believes that literal translations 
suffice; even when the claimant is a persecuted nomad from a 
Saharan tribe, for example, there is little in the way of cultural 
orientation for Senior Immigration Officers and adjudicators who, 
from my own experience, generally demonstrate feeble 
understanding of such crucial notions as time, truth, or spatial 
orientation of diverse cultural groups17. They are not as 
blatantly narrow-minded as Cesare, from the citation I mentioned 
at the beginning, who thinks that everybody does deep down 
17. Kälin seems to have had similar experiences in Switzerland. He 
states that "the cultural relativity of words, notions and 
concepts, and, even more importantly, the lack of consciousness 
of these differences in perception, are major sources of 
misunderstandings in cross-cultural communication. The 
problem certainly affects the asylum procedure: Too often 
officials assume that the way they think is also the way the 
asylum-seeker things... This may result in serious 
misunderstandings and even contribute to the denial of asylum 
for genuine refugees who, while doing their best to give all the 
requested information, fail because their counterpart 
misinterprets their statements" (p. 234). 
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speak Italian and those who don't admit it are simply rude or 
ignorant. But in asking that interpreters limit themselves to the 
words without allowing for a larger space of bodily and cultural 
interpretation, Immigration Canada, and I might add most other 
officials who deal with cross-cultural or cross-contextual 
translation, are guilty of another kind of closed-mindedness. Too 
many cases exist in which the officials clearly misunderstood the 
cultural context of the claim and therefore found contradictions 
where there were none, or uncovered so-called "lies" when a 
simple explanation from a learned advisor would have sufficed. 
There is no reason for Cesare to believe that coccode-e-eh does not 
sound like a chicken, so he uses it, fully expecting the Russian 
peasants to understand his meaning. And there is no reason for 
the Ghanian claimant to think that "brother" shouldn't imply 
"member of a tribe" for the officials at an immigration hearing. 
But if he is wrong, and if the interpreter does not fill in the 
appropriate information, the consequences could be tragic. Of 
course there is a danger in what I am suggesting; allowing more 
leeway to interpreters may act against the interests of the 
claimant if the interpreter, for whatever reason, does not act in 
good faith. Appealing to interpreters who are natives of the 
claimant's country of origin may lead to conscious or 
unconscious bias practised by a judgemental interpreter or by a 
suspicious claimant, because, as Walter Kälin notes, "in these 
cases asylum-seekers regularly suspect the interpreter of being a 
collaborator with the embassy of their country, capable of passing 
information to the persecuting government" (p. 233). Considering 
the refugee claimant's previous experience with government 
agents and agencies, such a reaction would not be irrational. Or 
there is the opposite risk, that the immigration officials suspect 
bias in interpretation because of an apparent collusion between 
two persons of the same national origin, or because the claimant 
is friendly with the interpreter: 
The official, therefore, might suspect them [the interpreters] of 
not merely translating but instead of interpreting and 
improving upon the statements of the applicant. This becomes 
a particular problem where, as is often the case, the interpreter 
comments upon and expresses open support for the asylum-
seeker's claims during the hearing. (Kälin, p. 233) 
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So in light of all of these pitfalls, what reforms should be 
put into place? By insisting upon a translation limited exclusively 
to words uttered is a means by which cultural diversity in 
language is profoundly limited; rendering experiences of 
persecution through monologized discourse alone is to deny that 
even single national languages contain within themselves a 
veritable plethora or languages, what M.M. Bakhtin called 
"heteroglossia18" and accounting for this heteroglossia would 
require a broader mandate for the interpreter and a broader 
range of discursive possibilities for the claimant. Bakhtin, for one, 
is not pessimistic in this regard; he suggests that the kind of 
interaction that translation demands forces us to examine the 
perspective of the other from both the inside and the outside, 
leading to a richer and potentially more living sense of the 
other's discourse: 
Thanks to the ability of a language to represent another 
language while still retaining the capacity to sound 
simultaneously both outside it and within it, to talk about it 
and at the same time to talk in and within it, to talk about it 
and at the same time to talk in and with it — and thanks to the 
ability of the language being represented simultaneously to 
serve as an object of representation while continuing to be able 
to speak to itself — thanks to all this, the creation of specific 
novelistic images of languages becomes possible. Therefore, the 
framing authorial context can least of all treat the language it 
is representing as a thing, a mute and unresponsive speech 
object, something that remains outside the authorial context as 
might any other object of speech19. 
18. On "monologism" and "heteroglossia" see the works of M.M. 
Bakhtin, in particular, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, eds. 
and int. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. 
McGee (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1986). 
19. M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination; Four Essays, ed. Michael 
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Texas, 
University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 358. 
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But interpreters must be provided with the tools for this kind of 
aggrandizement, and the system must be rendered sufficiently 
open-ended to permit its participants to learn from, rather than 
suppress, the persons with whom it interacts. Thus in the short 
term, before what I would consider as the necessary radical 
upheaval of the present system that adjudicates migrations of 
persons20, we need cultural translators with a larger range of 
possibilities. There may be a second possibility here, to which I 
am increasingly partial considering the nature of the present 
crisis in immigration and refugee law (the rise of the right, 
particularly in Germany and in France, the present trend towards 
limiting access to the system through "third country clauses," the 
introduction of severe penalties for assisting potential claimants, 
and so forth), which is to recognize the insurmountable 
difficulties of the hearing, and to put into place instead a system 
of quotas for each country in the First World depending upon 
their capacity to absorb new persons. This kind of system, 
though inherently more impartial, would cause other problems 
related to international cooperation, potentially unrealistic or 
inflexible quotas that cannot account for sudden upheaval, or 
forms of detrimental competition amongst countries for the most 
desirable (i.e. most Westernized, or highly educated, or rich) 
refugees (as we see in the realm of immigration determination). 
But until the system is modified to actually account for day-to-
day problems posed by intercultural communication, the 
Immigration Department will not be able to meet its own 
voluntarily-acquiesced obligations and criteria for the 
adjudication of Convention refugee claims; and if we follow our 
present course (the Mulroney bills C-55, C-84, C-86, etc.) 
countries like Canada will continue to modify the system to the 
20. This would entail international agreement that refugees are 
often produced because nations, corporations or other groups 
render acceptable lifestyles unbearable through their 
interference in, or their neglect of, the lives of the innocent. To 
view refugee determination as a duty and an obligation 
imposed by our own actions would be a valuable first step 
towards amending inequalities that are often the result of our 
considering the offer of "safe haven" as an example of charity. 
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point where access to the hearing will be limited to the rich, the 
well-connected, or the highly-trained rather than the most needy. 
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RÉSUMÉ: The Interpreter and the Canadian Convention Refugee 
Hearing: Crossing the potentially life-threatening boundaries between 
"coccode-e-eh," "cluck-cluck," and "cot-cot-cot" — L'auteur passe en 
revue les difficultés que rencontrent les traducteurs et les interprètes lors 
des enquêtes dont les demandeurs d'asile ont fait l'objet en 1987 au 
Canada. 11 propose une théorie de l'interprétation qui rendrait compte 
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